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When we speak, we spontaneously produce gestures (co-
speech gestures). Co-speech gestures and speech production 
are closely interlinked. However, the exact nature of the link 
is still under debate. To addressed the question that whether 
co-speech gestures originate from the speech production 
system or from a system independent of the speech 
production, the present study examined the relationship 
between co-speech and co-thought gestures. Co-thought 
gestures, produced during silent thinking without speaking, 
presumably originate from a system independent of the 
speech production processes. We found a positive correlation 
between the production frequency of co-thought and co-
speech gestures, regardless the communicative function that 
co-speech gestures might serve. Therefore, we suggest that 
co-speech gestures and co-thought gestures originate from a 
common system that is independent of the speech production 
processes.  
Keywords: co-thought gestures; co-speech gestures; speech 
production. 
 
People often spontaneously gesture when they speak (co-
speech gestures). There is a consensus in the literature that 
co-speech gesture and speech production are tightly linked. 
They are highly coordinated semantically and well 
synchronized temporally (McNeill, 1992). For example, a 
speaker may draw circles in the air with an extended index 
finger and say “rotating” simultaneously when describing a 
rotational movement. When speech is dysfluent, gesture is 
interrupted as well. Mayberry and Jaques (2000) showed 
that co-speech gestures were held motionless during 
stuttering in speech. Furthermore, speaking and gesturing 
can influence each other. The way people verbally 
expressed a motion event had an effect on the way they 
gesturally depicted it (Kita & Özyürek, 2003) and 
prohibiting or allowing gesture could alter children’s 
explanations of Piagetian conservation tasks (Alibali & Kita, 
under review).   
However, there is a lack of consensus regarding the exact 
nature of the link between co-speech gesture and speech 
production. One class of theories claims that these two 
systems are inherently inseparable. According to McNeill 
(1992), speech and gesture are a single-integrated system 
and they both arise from a “growth point”, which is the 
speaker’s minimal idea unit that combines image and word. 
Meanwhile, some other researchers suggest that co-speech 
gesture originates from subprocesses of speech production. 
For example, gesture is generated from the lexical retrieval 
process (Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; Rauscher, Krauss & 
Chen, 1996) or the “conceptualizer”, which specifies the 
pre-linguistic message to be verbalized in the next utterance 
(de Ruiter, 2000). Generally speaking, this class of theories 
holds that co-speech gesture production is inseparable from 
the speech production process. 
An alternative view is that co-speech gesture and speech 
production are two interactive but independent systems 
(Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003). Kita and Lausberg 
(2008) found that the linguistically non-dominant 
hemisphere alone in split-brain patients can generate co-
speech gestures based on spatial imagery. This result 
indicates that co-speech gesture and speech production are 
dissociable processes. In addition, co-speech gestures can 
express different information from the concurrent speech 
(e.g., Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988; Garber & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2002). The semantic mismatch between 
co-speech gesture and speech indicates that at least some 
gestures are produced independently of the speech 
production process. Kita (2000) further proposed that co-
speech gesture is generated from spatio-motoric thinking (or 
an “Action Generator” in Kita & Özyürek, 2003), which 
organizes information with action schemas and their 
modulation according to the environmental information. In 
other words, co-speech gestures originate from a cognitive 
system that is independent of the speech production system 
and responsible for generating body movements in the 
physical environment.  
In addition to co-speech gestures, people also 
spontaneously gesture when they solve problems without 
speaking (co-thought gestures). Schwartz and Black (1996) 
asked participants to verbally explain their solutions of 
some simple gear problems. The authors found that many 
participants produced co-thought gestures before their 
verbal response. Furthermore, people spontaneously 
produce co-thought gestures during problem solving even in 
a task that does not involve any use of language. Chu and 
Kita (2008) found that people spontaneously produced co-
thought gestures in a mental rotation task, in which 
participants seated alone in a room and only needed to make 
left or right judgments by pressing the correspondent foot 
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pedal. These co-thought gestures presumably originate from 
an action generation system that does not involve any 
speech production process.  Therefore, if one assumes that 
co-speech gestures originate from a part of speech 
production processes (e.g., Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; de 
Ruiter, 2000; McNeill, 1992), then co-speech and co-
thought gestures must originate from two different 
processes. Consequently, there should be no systematic 
relationship between the two behaviours (see Figure 1a).  In 
contrast, if one assumes that co-speech and co-thought 
gestures both originate from an action generation system 
(outside of the speech production process), then there may 
be a systematic relationship between the two behaviours 




Figure 1. Two possible mechanisms underlying the 
production of co-thought and co-speech gesture.  
 
Chu and Kita (2008) indeed found a systematic 
relationship between co-thought and co-speech gestures, 
suggesting that they may originate from a single system. 
Over the course of the experiment, the rate of both co-
thought and co-speech gestures decreased, and the 
representational contents of both co-thought and co-speech 
gestures changed in the same pattern. These parallel 
findings between co-thought and co-speech gestures suggest 
that they may originate from the same system, which is 
independent of the speech production system. 
The present study aims to investigate whether co-speech 
gestures originate from the speech production system or 
from a system that is independent of the speech production 
processes. We used a within-participant design to examine 
the relationship between the rates of co-thought gestures and 
co-speech gestures. Individuals differ greatly as to how 
often they produce co-speech gestures (Hostetter & Alibali, 
2007) and co-thought gestures (Chu & Kita, 2008). If co-
thought and co-speech gestures originate from a common 
system, we should expect a correlation between the rates of 
co-thought and co-speech gestures. However, if they 
originate from different systems, there should not be any 
systematic relationship. 
In the present study, we also manipulated the 
communicative context of the tasks that were used to elicit 
co-speech gestures. A robust finding in the literature is that 
the rate of co-speech gesture varies according to the 
communicative context.  Speakers produce more co-speech 
gestures in a face-to-face interaction than in conditions in 
which gestures cannot be seen by the addressee (Alibali, 
Heath, & Meyer, 2001; Bavelas, et al., 2008; Cohen, 1977). 
One possible explanation of this rate difference may be that 
co-speech gestures originate from different mechanisms in 
different communicative contexts. For example, in a face-to-
face interaction, co-speech gestures might purely serve for 
communicative purpose, whereas in the gesture non-visible 
condition, co-speech gestures might merely be triggered by 
the cognitive demands from the speakers themselves. 
Therefore, the present study obtained the rates of co-speech 
gestures in situations in which the speaker talks to an 
addressee face-to-face and to a tape-recorder alone in the 
room.  We correlated the co-thought gesture rates with the 
co-speech gesture rates in both conditions to see if the 
correlation was robust across communicative contexts in 




Forty one native English speakers (37 females and 4 males) 
at the University of Birmingham took part in this 
experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. The participants’ age ranged from 18 to 28 
years (M = 19.05, SD = 1.73). 
Tasks 
Mental rotation task. Shepard and Metzler (1971) type of 
three-dimensional objects was used (see Figure 2) to elicit 
co-thought gestures. The upper left and right objects were 
mirror images of each other. The lower object was rotated in 
four angles (60°, 120°, 240° and 300°) around the bisector 
that went through the object's centre between the horizontal 
and vertical axis, the horizontal and in-depth axis, and the 
vertical and in-depth axis. The lower object was rotated 
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from the upper left object in half of the trials and from the 




Figure 2. An example of a stimulus (Lower object, 60 
degrees on bisector of x-axis and y-axis rotation; Upper left 
and right objects in the canonical position). 
 
Participants seated alone in a room and their task was to 
make a judgment on whether the lower object was the same 
as the upper left or right object by pressing the 
correspondent left or right foot pedal. They were told that 
accuracy was the first priority, and it was not important to 
respond quickly. We de-emphasized quickness of responses 
so that spontaneous gestures were not suppressed due to the 
time pressure. Each trial began with a white fixation cross in 
the center of the screen for 1000ms, followed by the 
stimulus. When the response was given, the next trial started 
automatically. No feedback was given concerning the 
accuracy of the response. During the experiment, 
participants responded with two foot-pedals silently, leaving 
their hands free for spontaneous gestures. Their behaviours 
were video-recorded by a hidden camera (Sony PAL DV).  
 
Speaking tasks. Four speaking tasks were used to elicit co-
speech gestures. In the geometric shape motion task, eight 
movie clips depicting movements of two geometric shapes 
(circle, triangle or cube) along a horizontal "floor" were 
presented to the participants on the computer screen. Each 
video clip was 4 seconds in duration and played once. Then 
participants were instructed to recount the scene in the 
movie clip. The other three description tasks were not 
analyzed in the current study. 
Each participant described half of the movie clips of the 
geometric shape motion task in the face-to-face condition 
and the other half in the tape recorder condition. In the face-
to-face condition, the experimenter faced the participant, 
and the video camera recording participants’ responses 
(PAL DV camera) was placed next to the experimenter. In 
the tape recorder condition, participants were left alone in 
the room and spoke to a tape recorder. Their responses were 
video-recorded by a hidden camera (Sony PAL DV). There 
were no practice trials preceding the main trials. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After filling out the 
informed consent form, participants first completed the 
mental rotation task. Then they were then given half of the 
speaking tasks either in the face-to-face condition or in the 
tape recorder condition. Next they were given some 
personality questionnaires which took about 30 minutes and 
the results are not going to be reported in this paper. Last, 
they completed the other half of the speaking tasks in the 
other condition. The order of the two conditions and the 
speaking tasks was counterbalanced across participants. At 
the end of the session, participants were debriefed of the 
hidden video camera and its purpose, and they were given 
the opportunity to request erasing the recording. None of the 
participants reported that they were aware of the hidden 
camera. 
Coding 
Participants’ verbal descriptions were transcribed verbatim, 
and all hand gestures were identified. Each gesture was 
categorised into the following two types (developed on the 
basis of the classification system in McNeill, 1992): (1) 
Representational gestures were the hand movements that (a) 
represented the perceptual information of the referent entity; 
(b) represented the movement of the referent entity; (c) 
pointed at the referent entity. For example, in the mental 
rotation task, if a participant simulated manipulating the 
stimulus object with the index finger and the thumb opposed, 
this would be counted as a representational gesture. In the 
geometric shape motion task, if a participant drew circles 
with her right index finger and moved her hand horizontally 
while saying “the ball rolled towards a square”, this hand 
movement would be counted as a representational gesture. 
(2) Non-representational gestures are those gestures that 
could not be classified as representational gestures, 
including (a) emblem gestures that conveyed 
conventionalized meanings, such as “maybe” (e.g., a flat 
hand with the palm down, wavering), “you know” (e.g., a 
flat hand with the palm up, possibly with a shoulder shrug); 
(b) beat gestures that were small, baton like gestures 
produced along with the rhythm of speech; (c) unclear 
gestures that were unable to be interpreted. 
In order to establish inter-coder reliability of gesture 
coding, 15% of all gesture coding was randomly selected, 
and a second independent coder classified the selected 
gesture (N = 287). The two coders' decisions matched 
96.17% for the gesture type coding (Cohen’s k = .79, p 
< .001). 
Results  
In the analysis, we focused on representational gestures. We 
examined the relationship between the rates of co-thought 
gestures (number of gestures per minute) in the non-
communicative mental rotation task and the rates of co-
speech gestures (number of gestures per minute) in the 
geometric shape motion in both face-to-face and tape 
recorder conditions. In the mental rotation task, the 
participants produced overall 259 gestures, 92.66% of which 
(N = 240) were representational gestures. In the geometric 
shape motion description task, the participants produced 
overall 721 gestures in the face-to-face condition, in which 
99.58% (N = 718) were representational gestures and 
overall 480 gestures in the tape recorder condition, in which 
98.96% (N = 475) were representational gestures. In line 
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with previous research (Cohen, 1977; Bavelas, et al., 2008), 
the participants produced more representational gestures in 
the face-to-face condition (M = 25.54 gestures per minute, 
SD = 15.89) than in the tape recorder condition (M = 12.68 
gestures per minute, SD = 12.46), t (40) = 6.07, p < .01.  
Because the distribution of the co-thought gesture rates 
data was highly skewed, the Spearman rho correlation was 
applied. The scatter plots of the correlation matrix for the 
gesture rates of the mental rotation task and the geometric 
shape motion description tasks is presented in Figure 3. The 
rates of co-thought gestures were significantly positively 
correlated with the rates of co-speech gestures both in the 
face-to-face condition, rho(41) = .35, p < .05 and in the tape 
recorder condition, rho(41) = .46, p < .01. Furthermore, the 
gesture rates in the face-to-face and tape recorder condition 
were significantly correlated rho(41) = .59, p < .01. 
Since gesture and spatial thinking are closely linked to 
each other (Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Chu & Kita, 2008; 
Ehrlich, Levine, & Goldin-Meadow, 2006), it is possible 
that the correlation between co-thought and co-speech 
gestures was attributed to individuals’ spatial ability, 
regardless whether co-thought and co-speech gestures 
originate from the same or different systems. Therefore, we 
examined the correlation between individuals’ performance 
in the mental rotation task (as an indicator of their spatial 
ability) and the rates of co-thought and co-speech gestures. 
To eliminate possible time-accuracy trade-off, we first 
transformed participants RTs and error rates into Z scores, 
and then used the sum of their RT Z scores and error rates Z 
scores to index their mental rotation performance. Therefore, 
the higher the sum of the Z scores, the worse their 
performance was. There was no significant correlation 
between the sum of the Z scores and the rates of co-thought 
gestures (rho(41) = .22, ns.), the rates of co-speech gestures 
in the face-to-face condition (rho(41) = -.07, ns.), the rates 
of co-speech gestures in the tape recorder condition (rho(41) 




Figure 3. Correlation matrix of co-thought gesture rates (per 
minute) in the mental rotation task and co-speech gesture 
rates (per minute) in the geometric shape motion description 
task 
Discussion  
The present study investigated whether co-speech gestures 
originate from the speech production processes or a system 
that is independent of the speech production processes by 
examining the relationship between co-speech gestures 
elicited in a verbal description task and co-thought gestures 
elicited in a non-communicative mental rotation task. We 
found a significant correlation between the rates of co-
thought gestures and the rates of co-speech gestures. The 
correlation was robust across different communicative 
context, and was not attributed to individuals’ spatial ability.  
As co-thought gestures in the non-communicative mental 
rotation task presumably originate from a system that does 
not involve any speech production processes, the positive 
correlation between the rates of co-thought and co-speech 
gestures indicates that co-thought and co-speech gestures 
originate from a common mechanism that is independent of 
speech production processes. This finding is in line with the 
idea that co-speech gestures originate from an action 
generation system that is independent of the speech 
production processes (Kita, 2000; Kita & Özyürek, 2003). 
The correlation between co-thought and co-speech gestures 
is also compatible with the findings from Chu & Kita (2008), 
in which they found a parallel pattern of results in co-
thought and co-speech gestures. These pieces of evidence 
cannot be explained by the theories which claim that the co-
speech gesture production is inherently inseparable from the 
speech production process. For example, co-speech gestures 
originate from a “growth point” consisting of a combination 
of an image representation and a linguistic category 
(McNeill, 1992) or from one of the stages of the speech 
production process (Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; de Ruiter 
2000). 
The results of this study does not exclude the possibility 
that only a subset of co-speech gestures originates from the 
same mechanism as co-thought gestures, and the rest of co-
speech gestures originate from a part of speech production 
processes. However, the most parsimonious interpretation is 
that all (representational) co-speech and co-thought gestures 
originate from a common mechanism. 
In addition, the lack of correlation between participants’ 
performance in the mental rotation task and the rates of co-
thought and co-speech gestures may shed some light on the 
study of individual differences in gesturing. To our 
knowledge, only one study so far has directly test the 
relation between spatial skill and gesture production, in 
which the authors also report a non-significant correlation 
between individuals’ spatial ability and the rates of co-
speech representational gestures (Hostetter & Alibali, 2007). 
Therefore, although gestures and spatial thinking are tightly 
linked (Kita & Özyürek, 2003; Chu & Kita, 2008; Ehrlich, 
Levine, & Goldin-Meadow, 2006) and speakers gesture 
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more often when they produce spatial contents than non-
spatial contents (Krauss, 1998), the link between 
individuals’ spatial ability and gesture production may not 
be straightforward, and possibly mediated by other factors 
such as language abilities (Hostetter & Alibali, 2007), 
personality, or the social situation. 
If the correlation between co-thought and co-speech 
gesture rates cannot be attributed to variability in spatial 
abilities, what can the correlation be attributed to? Based on 
Hostter and Alibali's (2008) theory on gesture production, 
we suggest that the correlation can be attributed to 
individual differences in the following two aspects of the 
action generation system. First, individuals may vary as to 
how strongly they activate actional representation when 
they process visuo-spatial information for thinking or 
speaking. Second, individuals may vary as to the 
"threshold" for producing overt gestures, that is, the 
minimum activation level of actional representation that 
triggers overt gestures. 
In sum, the present study provides further understanding 
of the link between gesture and speech production. We 
suggest that co-speech gestures originate from a system that 
is independent of speech production processes. However, it 
should be noted that the present study only focused on 
representational gestures, it is possible that only 
representational co-speech gestures originate from a system 
that is independent of speech production processes, and 
other type of gestures such as beat gestures (baton like 
gestures highlighting some aspects of discourse structure, 
McNeill, 1992) or emblem gestures (conventional gestures 
such as a “ok” sign) may instead originate from speech 
production processes. Of course, further studies need to be 
done to examine their link with speech production. In 
addition, to our knowledge, there are very few studies 
investigating co-thought gestures, which are the 
spontaneous representational arm and hand movements 
produced during silent thinking. We suggest that future 
studies on gestures should not only focus on the speech-
accompanying gestures, but also co-thought gestures, which 
also play important roles in learning and problem solving. 
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